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 “And What Good Came Of It At Last?” Press-politician relations post Leveson1 
Steven Barnett and Judith Townend 
 
Introduction: turning power on its head  
In the opening paragraph of his seminal book “The Abuse of Power”, James Margach writes 
of what he calls “the complex and fascinating exercise of real power in a war which has been 
neglected to an astonishing extent…”.  He talks about the “almost obsessional ruthlessness” 
with which most of the dozen Prime Ministers whom he had personally known as a Sunday 
Times political correspondent had sought to dominate the media. They wanted, he said, to 
“enrol and exploit the media as an arm of government”, with the ultimate objective of 
consolidating their own personal power.2 
His argument was that the Executive (a combination of Government and Whitehall) had 
eroded the power of Parliament and had created an “elective dictatorship” in which Prime 
Ministers were centralising power through systematic news management combined with a 
new breed of government information officers and an “impenetrable” Official Secrets Act. 
This creeping attempt at manipulation of the press demanded greater detached scrutiny, 
where journalists must avoid the temptation – as Walter Lippman had advised many years 
earlier – of any intimacy with those they should be scrutinising.  
Margach did not absolve the press itself from all criticism, and reminded his readers of what 
he called the “four crises” involving Government and Press in which press behaviour had 
been excessive. First was that generation of press lords in the 1930s, including Beaverbrook 
and Rothermere, who had attempted to destroy the serving Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, 
by creating their own party. Then came the post-war press attack on Clement Attlee, an 
“unbridled campaign of screaming irresponsibility” in which sections of the press pursued 
Attlee’s government with reckless distortions. Third was reporting of the Vassall spy scandal 
under Macmillan, when the subsequent Radcliffe Tribunal concluded that they could find no 
truth in any of the press reports. And fourth, a year before Margach was writing, was a 
strident campaign by the Daily Mail about alleged corruption at the troubled car 
manufacturers British Leyland which, it transpired, was based on a forged letter. 
By modern standards, these were scarcely heinous crimes. But Margach’s main point was 
that these events served only to amplify further the burgeoning power of Downing Street as 
successive Prime Ministers took advantage of press vulnerability in the wake of each crisis to 
further Whitehall’s obsessive secrecy and their own stranglehold on unaccountable political 
power.  
His account, which stretched from Lloyd George in 1916 to James Callaghan in 1977, is a 
familiar cri de coeur from political journalists down the ages, arising from their pivotal fourth 
estate role of holding power to account, guarding against demagoguery and autocracy, and 
dismantling the walls of executive secrecy. It is ironic that Margach ends with Callaghan, 
probably the last British Prime Minister who did not regard the press – including broadcasters 
 – as central to their own political aspirations both to enter Downing Street and, once there, to 
implementation of their government’s policies. From Margaret Thatcher onwards, it was the 
new British press barons – in particular, but by no means exclusively, Rupert Murdoch – who 
became the power brokers, wooed by aspiring political leaders and crossed only at grave 
Prime Ministerial peril. In other words, the power struggle which so troubled Margach 
became inverted: in the 35 years since Margaret Thatcher succeeded Callaghan as Prime 
Minister, the Executive became cowed by – or at the very least complicit in – an increasingly 
powerful and self-aggrandising press.  
From Thatcher to “feral beasts” to Leveson 
To what extent favours were granted during those 35 years in return for political support – or 
at least to quell editorial hostility – is still a matter of debate. But there is no doubt that 
questionable political decisions were taken and that close relationships were forged during 
those 35 years – perhaps with the honourable exception of John Major’s administration from 
1990 to 1997 – which would have deeply disturbed Margach. Within two years of Mrs 
Thatcher becoming Prime Minister, recent evidence suggests that she personally intervened 
to ensure that Rupert Murdoch was allowed to acquire the Times and Sunday Times without 
referral to the competition authorities, despite already owning the Sun and News of the 
World.3 It was Thatcher, too, who guaranteed that the 1990 Broadcasting Act – which 
legislated for the first time to place limits on cross-media ownership – contained an 
exemption for Murdoch’s nascent Sky satellite operation.4 
When he took over the Labour leadership and launched his “New Labour” makeover, Tony 
Blair was determined to make overtures to the press in general, and to News Corp in 
particular. His trip to the Cayman Islands to speak at the News Corporation annual 
conference in 1995 is now the stuff of political legend, and he himself has not concealed his 
determination to avoid the kind of personal and political demolition suffered by the Labour 
leader Neil Kinnock in the months leading up to the 1992 general election. While he has 
vigorously denied any media policy deal-making – and the record on Labour’s 2003 
Communications Act is ambiguous – the evidence again demonstrates that he went to 
enormous lengths to ingratiate himself with a media that he once described as “like living 
with a demented tenant.”5 
Lance Price, who worked as Alastair Campbell’s deputy in the communications office from 
1998 to 2000, has written that he was told by “someone in the know” shortly after he joined 
Number 10 that “we’ve promised News International we won’t make any changes to our 
Europe policy without talking to them”. He quotes the Guardian columnist Hugo Young as 
arguing that Blair would have to “face down the screaming and the bullying, which is the 
British tabloids’ matchless contribution to democracy”.6 Both Rothermere and his then 
executive editor-in-chief David English were also courted, albeit somewhat more discreetly. 
According to Tim Allan, Price’s predecessor in the first few years of Blair’s government, “the 
government spent years trying to be chummy with the Daily Mail [and] ……wasted far too 
much time trying to turn the Mail around”.7 
 It is therefore scarcely surprising that Blair himself became convinced of the media’s 
destructive potential, and concluded in retrospect that perhaps his government should have 
acted earlier to curb a growing and unhealthy concentration of unaccountable press power. 
When he first articulated his Damascene conversion two weeks before standing down from 
office in 2007, it caused a predictable storm. In a speech to the Reuters Institute, he said:  
“I am going to say something that few people in public life will say, but most know is 
absolutely true: a vast aspect of our jobs today…. is coping with the media, its sheer scale, 
weight and constant hyperactivity. At points, it literally overwhelms.” In the passage which 
inevitably wrote its own headlines, in talking about the destructive nature of that 
hyperactivity, he said: “Today’s media, more than ever before, hunts [sic] in a pack. In these 
modes it is like a feral beast, just tearing people and reputations to bits”. He ended: 
I do believe this relationship between public life and media is now damaged in a 
manner that requires repair. The damage saps the country’s confidence and self-belief; 
it undermines its assessment of itself, its institutions; and above all, it reduces our 
capacity to take the right decisions, in the right spirit for our future.8 
Perhaps the most revealing fallout from this speech – apart from the predictable outrage it 
created amongst the well-paid commentariat – was a subsequent conversation with Blair 
reported by Sky News political editor Adam Boulton. According to Boulton, Blair regretted 
not mentioning the Mail newspapers (he had strangely singled out the Independent), and said 
that although the Daily Mail had been the real target, “he feared what the paper would do to 
him and his family should he have targeted it”.9 Whatever political power had been exercised 
by the media barons of the 1930s, it never reached such a pitch of intimidation that a serving 
Prime Minister was terrified of criticising their newspapers.  
That sense of awe and trepidation was inherited by Blair’s two successors, Gordon Brown 
and David Cameron, as each attempted to forge their own alliances with powerful publishers 
and, if not tame, then at least not antagonise those “feral beasts”. Suddenly, on 4 July 2011, it 
seemed that this toxic relationship had been irrevocably shattered. The Guardian published its 
revelations that the News of the World had hacked the phone of murdered schoolgirl Milly 
Dowler and three days later, Rupert Murdoch announced that after 168 years the News of the 
World was to close. A day later, Prime Minister David Cameron announced a judicial enquiry 
to be led by Lord Justice Leveson, admitting that politicians were to blame for “turning a 
blind eye” to bad practices in journalism. He went on to say that the phone hacking scandal 
presented a “genuine opportunity” and a “cathartic moment” for both media and politicians. 
Giving evidence to the House of Commons liaison committee on 6 September, he conceded 
that he had personally allowed himself to get too close to media proprietors and editors, and 
said: “The relationship between politicians and media needs resetting and I think there is an 
opportunity in this Parliament to do that”.  
After 12 months of oral evidence which included four former prime ministers and over 30 
leading politicians from the previous 30 years, on 29 November 2012, Lord Justice Leveson 
published his 1987 page report and 92 recommendations for change. All the indications 
 therefore pointed to a seismic shift in those power relationships which would, indeed, see 
some kind of “resetting” in light of Leveson’s recommendations. 
The rest of this paper looks at two specific areas in which leading politicians seemed eager 
during their evidence to accept a need for change. Had there genuinely been a seismic shift in 
press-politics relationships, we would have expected a fundamental policy shift in both those 
areas. We conclude, however, that current evidence suggests the prospect of very little 
change. 
1. Data Protection - “a classic case study in realpolitik” 
In 2005, private investigator Steve Whittamore received a two year conditional discharge 
after pleading guilty to offences under the Data Protection Act 1998. His notebooks, 
recovered during the Operation Motorman investigation by the Information Commissioner’s 
Office (ICO), had recorded personal details relating to over 4,000 people and, significantly, 
who had paid for them. It transpired that Whittamore’s clients included numerous national 
media organisations and the ICO’s 2006 report, What Price Privacy? (WPP), revealed that 
305 journalists had been identified as “customers driving the illegal trade in confidential 
personal information”.10 Although the ICO threatened it would “not hesitate to take action 
against any journalist identified during the Motorman investigations who is suspected in 
future of committing an offence”11, no journalist was prosecuted.  
The ICO’s response to the Motorman revelations was to recommend a new policy approach 
to data protection offences: the introduction of a two year prison sentence for breaches of 
Section 55 of the Data Protection Act and a specific recommendation that the Press 
Complaints Commission should “take a much stronger line to tackle press involvement in this 
illegal trade”12.  Data protection guidelines for the press were published, but the first policy 
goal – the introduction of custodial sentences – has never been achieved (although it exists in 
inactive legislation). The ICO’s decision not to pursue prosecutions was the result of a “three-
way negotiation” between the ICO, press and government, according to the Leveson Inquiry 
report and part of what Mr Robert Jay, counsel to the Inquiry, described as a “classic case 
study in realpolitik”. What exactly did that entail, and what does the “negotiation” tell us 
about the operation of media power?  
In 2008 the then Secretary of State for Justice, Jack Straw was in a difficult position. The 
government needed to enact the Criminal Justice and Immigration bill speedily, to bring in 
provisions relating to industrial action by prison officers and avoid the prisons going into 
“meltdown”. Unfortunately, this Bill was also the vehicle for introducing the ICO’s 
recommendations on custodial sentences for breaches of data protection, and the relevant 
Clause 75 was bitterly opposed by the press. Straw’s answer was to replace clause 75 with 
two amendments: one creating powers to alter the penalty for DPA breaches, and thus create 
custodial sentences for DPA 1998 Section 55 offences; and one introducing a “subjective 
test” as a special defence for journalism which went beyond existing public interest defences. 
“Royal assent had to be obtained by a certain date for reasons extraneous really to the merits 
 of the case in Section 55,” Mr Jay explained during a session that questioned Straw on media 
influences on public policy: 
Had it not been for that consideration and/or the pressure that you were under by the 
press, would your policy position have been either adhere to the original position, in 
other words just up the sentence to include a custodial penalty, or were you in fact 
persuaded by the merits of the argument that the subjective/objective test should be 
introduced?13 
Straw responded by setting out the various time pressures, including his concern that the bill 
would be blocked in the House of Lords, but continued: “I’d like to think that even in slower 
time I would have made the same judgment about the subjective defence that was inserted, 
but I can’t say for certain”.  As it was, the Act was passed, a prisons crisis averted, and a 
compromise between the press and the ICO was apparently reached – at the behest of the 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown.   
 However, the compromise was something of a wasted exercise as the amendments in 
question were never actually activated. To this day, there are no custodial sentences available 
for S55 breaches, nor the accompanying subjective test to protect the press. According to the 
Leveson report, commencement requires an Order-making power “which has not to date been 
exercised”. For Straw, that was a point of regret: “I wish I’d done it before the election. I 
can’t remember why I didn’t, but anyway”. Disappointingly, he is not pushed further on the 
reasoning, although he mentions that there is “a wider issue about activation of legislation”.  
Press concern appeared to be a major factor in Straw’s hasty decision to water down the 
relevant amendments, and subsequently not to activate them. For Leveson, it was “clear that 
pressure from the press as a whole was brought to bear, but cause and effect is not necessarily 
established by narrating the relevant sequence of events”.14 It is therefore necessary to look in 
detail at the different components of press lobbying and exercise of press power on this issue.  
Industry “representatives” and access to politicians 
There had been “a lot of conversations with Mr Dacre and other senior colleagues from the 
press about Section 55 of the Data Protection Act and the increase in sentences”, according to 
Jack Straw. Specifically, he had been approached by a number of individuals, Paul Dacre 
(editor of the Daily Mail), Rebekah Brooks (née Wade and editor of the Sun), Murdoch 
MacLennan, chief executive of Telegraph Media Group, and Guy Black, then an advisor for 
TMG, who Straw interpreted as “representing the views of the national press as a whole”. 
Robert Jay probed this assumption: 
Mr Robert Jay: Because these were the most powerful figures, either within the PCC or on 
the Editors’ Code Committee, was that your inference? 
Mr Jack Straw: Yes. I never, Mr Jay, said, “Can we see your precise credentials?” They 
plainly were and are - were powerful figures who were representing the generality of the …” 
 Straw then met Dacre, MacLennan and Brooks, and wrote to Dacre on 12 February 2008. He 
explained that the government appreciated their concerns, although he was not aware that 
Section 55 (with its non-custodial sanctions) had caused any chilling effect on media freedom 
of expression. However, as he explained when they met, he “was increasingly minded to 
consider inclusion of provision for the reasonable belief of someone at the time an offence 
was committed”. Nonetheless, he was keen for the bill to pass quickly, owing to the 
provisions relating to industrial action in prisons, a scenario described by Jay as a “a double 
pincer movement”: on one side, Straw faced the “press stirring up trouble” and on the other, a 
pressing need to get the bill through. Thus, Straw felt it unnecessary to challenge the 
authority of a small coterie of powerful media figures, whom he took to represent the views 
of the wider industry and who had easy personal access to his own office. 
Conflicting versions of how and when influence was exerted 
At the Society of Editors’ conference in 2008 Paul Dacre spoke dramatically of a “truly 
frightening amendment” to the DPA, which would have Britain “the only country in the free 
world to jail journalists”. Fortunately, he said, the Prime Minister Gordon Brown “was 
hugely sympathetic to the industry’s case and promised to do what he could to help”. Under 
the “brokerage of Number 10” there were meetings with Jack Straw and officials. “The 
lobbying on both sides was fast and furious”, he said, with the Information Commissioner 
Richard Thomas determined to bring in custodial sentences. It was a “rear-guard” action, but 
a compromise was reached with amendments allowing protection for journalists who had a 
‘reasonable belief’ that their actions were in the public interest. More pertinently, in Dacre’s 
view, the Act was amended so that “the jailing clause cannot now be implemented unless the 
Secretary of State seeks approval from Parliament to activate it”. 
This was not how Gordon Brown saw it. He described how he had dinner with Les Hinton, 
Murdoch McLellan and Paul Dacre on 10 September 2007:  
I told them, as we started the dinner, what my own view was. I didn’t ask them for 
their view, I’m afraid. Maybe I should have. I told them what my view was, that there 
should be a public interest defence, and therefore it wasn’t a question of them 
lobbying me. I was informing them that this was my view, but that [ministers] were 
consulting people about how we could implement this in a way where there was a 
public interest defence but we weren’t going to back off entirely the potential need for 
legislation. 
For Robert Jay, the accounts by Dacre and Brown did not match. Brown disagreed, saying the 
two accounts were not mutually exclusive: “They raised it, but I told them as they raised it: 
‘Look, this is my view’.” A little further on, Jay pushed the point again:  
Mr Dacre’s account is that you were hugely sympathetic to the industry’s case and 
promised to do what you could to help. It sounds as if the industry, through Mr Dacre, 
Mr Hinton and Mr McLellan, were allowed to put their case and you were persuaded 
by it; is that fair or not? 
 Brown defended the point vigorously: “…these were my views and I think any suggestion 
that I was under pressure from the industry and yielded to it is quite ridiculous”. 
In light of this evidence, the final report is troubled by a few inconsistences: why, for 
example, was the government pushing ahead with the bill in 2008 without a public interest 
defence if Brown was sympathetic to the press argument in 2007? For this reason, it finds 
that “the impact of the private dinner of 10 September 2007 on the evolution of Government 
policy at this time is difficult to tell”.15 Dacre’s speech suggested that the dinner had made a 
difference, but government policy remained unchanged until later negotiations with Jack 
Straw.  Straw was also questioned on whether he had been persuaded by the press case; the 
final report found that “understandably, and very frankly” Straw had found that awkward to 
answer, “given the difficulty in disentangling cause from effect: as he put it, ‘because I 
became persuaded, if you follow me, so you have to work out why you were persuaded...’”.16  
These exchanges demonstrate, as will invariably be the case when reputations are at stake, 
that cause and effect of policy shifts can be difficult to establish. No Prime Minister or senior 
politician will willingly admit to having been browbeaten by any industry lobbyist – least of 
all the press – into legislation they did not support. Nevertheless, the sequence of events, and 
the very detailed (and unusually public) account by Paul Dacre of his concerns and 
subsequent compromise by the government, suggests at the very least that concessions were 
made which were not initially either mooted or welcomed.   
Press influence on the ICO and Leveson’s response 
Negotiations over data protection began in 2006 and 2007 when the Information 
Commissioner Richard Thomas pursued what he called a “twin-track approach” to deal with 
the discoveries of Operation Motorman: he initiated a dialogue with the Press Complaints 
Commission (PCC), and simultaneously began a campaign to persuade the government to 
introduce custodial sentences for S55.17  
This twin-track policy led to the “three-way negotiation” between the press, government and 
ICO, which included the later meetings between Straw, Brown and the press detailed above. 
Parallel to this, no prosecutions were brought against the media. Richard Thomas explained 
this inaction in terms of fear of the consequences: “perhaps thank goodness we did not 
prosecute the journalists”, whom counsel had advised were “tricky, well armed and well 
briefed, effectively a barrel of monkeys”. In Thomas’s view, “[t]he impact for the office 
would have been very, very demanding indeed” if prosecutions against the press had been 
brought, and he was unequivocal about levels of press influence: “…it became increasingly 
clear that the press were able to assert very substantial influence on public policy and the 
political processes”. In oral evidence to Leveson he explained that he may even have been 
better advised not to draw attention to the press abuses revealed by Operation Motorman:   
[I]n the matters covered by this Statement, the press had a direct interest and a hostile 
attitude which made it very difficult to achieve our objectives. The history of the 
campaign over the Criminal Justice and Immigration Bill … left me in no doubt about 
the power of the press. I can recall saying to my colleagues in 2007 and 2008 that, 
 with hindsight, it may have been a mistake on our part to have highlighted press 
misconduct in our reports. We may have made better progress if we had concentrated 
more on breaches of s55 by other sectors. 
The press therefore wielded power on two levels: first, media organisations appeared to be 
immune from possible criminal prosecutions arising from the Motorman relevations or 
alternative civil law responses; and second, they were able to run a successful ‘counter-
campaign’ to the proposed custodial sentences for S55.  
In his report, Leveson is unsympathetic to the lack of regulatory and legal progress and 
comments that “it is noteworthy that at no stage since the Motorman material was found has 
the ICO raised as an issue the sufficiency of its powers to tackle breach of the data protection 
regime by the press”.18 This is crucial in making sense of the ICO-press part of the 
negotiations. While the CPS has a role in handling criminal prosecutions, the ICO is the only 
authority with the appropriate civil powers. However, it appeared reluctant to even consider 
pursuing the media over data protection breaches through a civil route. Leveson quotes 
Alexander Owens, a former ICO employee, to highlight the “operational implications” of the 
ICO’s approach: “It’s our job to take them or indeed anyone else on, that’s what we are paid 
to do. If we do not do it, then who does?”19 
Leveson is similarly scathing about the government’s response, and does not appear 
convinced that the non-commencement of S55 provisions is entirely accidental:  
…the legislative process by which the maximum penalty was increased and the 
defence to the substantive offence available to journalists broadened, with both 
changes left uncommenced, was strongly indicative of a political compromise, 
designed as much as anything to quieten two opposing campaigning voices rather than 
as a response to a thought through policy analysis for which there was genuine 
empirical evidence. It is not surprising to find that the delicate balance of the 
compromise has not proved something which succeeding Secretaries of State for 
Justice have been in a hurry to revisit. 
Additionally, he was unpersuaded by press concern of a “chilling effect” arising from the 
custodial sentences introduced in the 2008 Act. Leveson saw this issue as an example of the 
press acting “as powerful lobbyists on self-interested questions of media law and policy” and 
therefore concluded that “the public interest, taken in the round, favours there being no 
further delay” in the implementation of relevant measures in respect of Section 55 breaches.  
Government inaction 
Lord Justice Leveson reported in November 2012, leaving Parliament and industry to act 
upon his final recommendations. What, then, of the recommendations on S55? In short, not 
much. The ICO has followed recommendations for its own approach by publishing draft 
guidance on the media and data protection, and launching a consultation which will close in 
April 2014. A response from government to a report on private investigators by the House of 
Commons Home Affairs select committee in July 2013 mentions Leveson’s recommendation 
 for the commencement of Sections 77 and 78. Instead of promising their activation, however, 
it proposes a consultation: 
Given the potentially far-reaching nature of Lord Justice Leveson’s proposals 
in relation to data protection, in particular for the conduct of responsible 
investigative journalism, it is the Government’s view that the 
recommendations require careful consideration by a wide audience. It is 
therefore our intention to conduct a public consultation on the full range of 
data protection proposals, including the introduction of custodial penalties, 
which will seek views on their impact and how they might be approached.20 
Most recently, in March 2014, Simon Hughes MP, Minister of State for Justice and Civil 
Liberties, promised that the government has “begun to review the sanctions available for 
breaches of the Act” so it “can decide whether to increase the penalties as the law permits”.21 
Chris Pounder, a data protection specialist, is sceptical of this official line; his reading is that 
the government now thinks a custodial offence is unnecessary and that there is political 
advantage in “waiting for Leveson” and the resolution of the even more troubled negotiations 
over press regulation. It would be, as he sees it, politically advantageous to delay this 
element, especially in light of the forthcoming general election. 22 At the time of writing, 
there is still no sign of the consultation, although it was mentioned again in a letter to the 
chairman of Parliament’s Home Affairs Committee from the incumbent Secretary of State for 
Justice, Chris Grayling, in September 2013. This is the latest (non) manoeuvre in this long-
running saga of media-legal policy realpolitik.  While this case is specific to the reach and 
powers of data protection regulation, its twists and turns reflect a much broader pattern of 
self-interested media influence on legal policymaking, exposed during other politicans’ 
evidence to the Leveson Inquiry.  
2. Media concentration – like-minded thinking of ministers and proprietors 
In the 22 months before the Guardian’s revelations of 4 July 2011 sparked a wholesale shift 
in political attitudes, a series of controversial negotiations had focussed attention on a policy 
issue which had been repeatedly aired but never resolved: concentration of media ownership 
and, in particular, the burgeoning media portfolio of News Corporation. News Corp’s bid for 
full control of the British TV satellite operation BSkyB was coming to a head at precisely the 
same moment as the Guardian exposé, a highly lucrative deal that was on the verge of 
completion.  
Controversy around News Corp’s undue influence had been revived in 2009 following a 
controversial speech by James Murdoch in his MacTaggart lecture, which prompted what 
appeared to be serious policy concessions by a Conservative party seeking victory at the next 
general election. Following a vehement attack on regulation and government intervention, 
Murdoch called for a “radical reorientation of the regulatory approach”, in particular a 
relaxation of rules restricting the number of advertising breaks and abolition of impartiality 
requirements which represented “an impingement on freedom of speech and on the right of 
people to choose what kind of news to watch.” He accused the BBC of producing “free, state-
 sponsored news” which throttled the news market. “We must have a plurality of voices and 
they must be independent. Yet we have a system in which state-sponsored media – the BBC 
in particular – grow ever more dominant.”23 
It was not a generally accepted vision of plurality, but the thrust of Murdoch’s thinking had 
already been echoed by senior Conservatives. A few weeks earlier, in condemning what he 
called “the growth of the quango state”, David Cameron appeared to single out Ofcom for 
particularly harsh criticism:  
Jeremy Hunt [then shadow culture minister] has concluded that Ofcom currently 
has…. responsibilities that are matters of public policy, in areas that should be part of 
a national debate, for example the future of regional news or Channel 4. These should 
not be determined by an unaccountable bureaucracy, but by ministers accountable to 
Parliament. So with a Conservative Government, Ofcom as we know it will cease to 
exist. Its remit will be restricted to its narrow technical and enforcement roles. It will 
no longer play a role in making policy.24  
Justifying his emphasis on Ofcom he subsequently told the Leveson Inquiry that, compared to 
Ofcom’s predecessor the Independent Television Commission, “I did think Ofcom was quite 
a good example of a quango that had got too big, too expensive, and the pay levels were 
pretty excessive.” But its size and cost was a direct consequence of having merged five 
separate regulators or government functions, of which the ITC represented just one; and 
salaries were comparable to others in the public sector. It was a flimsy explanation. 
Less than two months after James Murdoch’s lecture, in an interview with the Financial 
Times, Jeremy Hunt had laid into the BBC, suggesting that it was out of touch with what 
licence-fee payers wanted and crushed media competition. He said that its governance 
structure, the BBC Trust, needed replacing and that his party was “looking into whether it 
would be appropriate to rip up the charter in the middle of it, or whether one should wait.”25 
In fact, as several serving and former senior ministers testified during Leveson, these were by 
no means isolated examples of apparent – though always denied – commitments or promises 
being made which chimed with the commercial and ideological interests of powerful media 
groups, and particularly News Corp.  
The politics of News Corp’s BSkyB bid  
Serious political questions were therefore raised when, just one month after the 2010 General 
Election, News Corporation bid for complete control of BSkyB. Although it effectively 
controlled the company through its 39.1% shareholding and James Murdoch was its 
chairman, ownership was diluted by independent directors representing other shareholders. 
Much more importantly given the fast-growing revenue flows from pay-TV, News Corp was 
only entitled to 39.1% of the £1 billion annual profits now being generated. Ben Bradshaw, 
the last Culture Secretary of the outgoing Labour government, was convinced that the bid’s 
timing was a calculated political move:   
 Murdoch’s desire to take full control of BSkyB was well known about before the 
election and one of the most commented upon media stories. We had expected a bid 
in Government until it became clear (again widely reported at the time) that News 
Corp were holding off making a formal bid in the hope they’d get a more favourable 
reception from a Conservative Government.26  
What made this a particularly potent issue was a last minute amendment to the 2003 
Communication Act, following a rebellion led by David Puttnam in the House of Lords. It 
introduced for the first time a public interest plurality clause to media mergers and 
acquisitions and allowed discretion to the Secretary of State to intervene if he thought there 
was a public interest threat. This had been resisted by the Labour government because, in the 
written evidence of then Culture Secretary Tessa Jowell, they feared that it “could lead to 
uncertainty in the market which would be bad for the development of the sector.” Though 
consistent with Labour’s emphasis on deregulation coupled with content regulation, this 
approach nevertheless prompted accusations of favouritism towards Murdoch and News 
Corp. 
Quite how politically toxic and vulnerable to prejudice the whole process could become was 
graphically revealed by the events of the following 12 months, and by private texts and 
correspondence which subsequently emerged during the Leveson Inquiry. The decision to 
intervene fell to the Business Secretary, the Liberal Democrat Vince Cable who issued a 
formal notice on 4 November asking Ofcom to investigate the proposed merger’s impact on 
media plurality. Although emphasising that he could only operate within the law, his written 
evidence to Leveson revealed the political context for his decision:  
Having considered all the evidence and submissions, it seemed clear to me that the 
proposed merger did raise genuine concerns affecting the public interest and that these 
should be properly considered. In my opinion as a politician, I also believed that the 
Murdochs’ political influence exercised through their newspapers had become 
disproportionate. The accusation that leading political figures in the Conservative 
Party and the Labour Party had offered disproportionate access to the Murdochs was 
widely made, as was the perception that both parties had shown excessive deference 
to their views (as expressed through News International newspapers).  
He also referred in his evidence to “inappropriate” approaches from News Corp 
representatives to his colleagues and went on: “These	  colleagues expressed some alarm about 
whether this whole affair was going to lead to retribution against the Liberal Democrats 
through News International newspapers.” Subsequent reports suggested that these were not 
exaggerated fears, and that threats to persecute the party through News International’s 
newspapers if the bid was referred had indeed been made to senior party members.27 
However, Cable’s involvement was cut short when, on 21 December 2010, a recording 
emerged of inappropriate comments he had made to two female reporters from the Daily 
Telegraph posing as his constituents, including a promise that he had “declared war on Mr 
Murdoch”. Given his quasi-judicial role in determining the outcome, his position was clearly 
 untenable and responsibility for the bid was immediately transferred to the Culture Secretary, 
Jeremy Hunt. 
Hunt himself, however, was a free-market Conservative and was not politically neutral. He 
had, it transpired during Leveson, sent the Prime Minister a private note on 19 November 
expressing his own disquiet about at Cable’s decision to intervene: 
“James Murdoch is pretty furious at Vince’s referral to Ofcom. He doesn’t think he 
will get a fair hearing from Ofcom. I am privately concerned about this because 
NewsCorp are very litigious and we could end up in the wrong place in terms of 
media policy…. I think it would be totally wrong to cave in to the Mark Thompson 
[then BBC Director General]/Channel 4/Guardian line that this represents a 
substantial change of control given that we all know Sky is controlled by NewsCorp 
now anyway.”28 
Further evidence of his position emerged through private texts which were also disclosed 
during Leveson. On the very same day that Vince Cable’s recorded comments were made 
public, the European Commission announced that it had cleared the competition aspect of the 
merger. Hunt sent a text to James Murdoch which read: “Great and congrats on Brussels, just 
Ofcom to go!”. He claimed during his evidence to Leveson – with some justification – that he 
then diligently followed due regulatory process regardless of his own prejudices. 
Nevertheless, the combination of Hunt’s manifestly positive disposition to the bid, 
Cameron’s own closeness to News International Chief Executive Rebekah Brooks, and the 
barrage of texts which were subsequently disclosed between Hunt’s special adviser Adam 
Smith and News International’s chief lobbyist Frederic Michel (suggesting a remarkably 
close relationship) all served to create inevitable suspicion about the process.  
In March 2011, it appeared that concessions demanded by Ofcom – including spinning off 
Sky News as an independent entity – had been met, and it remained only for a formal 
consultation period before approval. By 1 July, the government was ready to give clearance 
and Hunt allowed one more week for opponents to register objections. In the middle of that 
period, the phone-hacking story ignited and – with Ofcom invoking its obligation to 
investigate whether broadcast licence holders were “fit and proper” people – News Corp 
withdrew its bid on 13 July. In the immediate aftermath, Nick Clegg said that the 
Government would review the “fit and proper” laws, and Vince Cable argued that laws 
governing media ownership were “clearly unsatisfactory”.  
Consensus on the need for action 
In their written and oral evidence to Leveson, leading figures from the last 25 years of 
government advanced arguments for substantial policy changes on media ownership. Former 
PM John Major was convinced that Parliament needed to act, telling Leveson in his oral 
evidence that “Parliament should set a limit on the percentage of the written press and the 
percentage of the electronic media that can be under the ownership of either one individual or 
one company…. There should be a limit beyond which, in the interests of plurality, no 
individual or single company should be permitted to go.” 
 Nick Clegg focussed more on the need for removing political calculations from the regulatory 
process on media mergers and acquisitions: “The Inquiry might want to consider suitable 
mechanisms to allow an independent regulator to trigger a market investigation…. into media 
ownership, without political interference.” In his oral evidence, he was even more explicit 
about the flimsiness of the current plurality regime and the need to remove politicians from 
the equation:  
If you read in the Enterprise Act how public interest and plurality are defined, you can 
run a coach and horses through it. And then, as we all know, there are various hoops 
you go through, the Secretary of State can…. refer the decision, and then makes a 
further decision on whether to refer it to the Competition Commission and so on and 
so forth. [We should] make that a more rational, coherent and more tightly defined 
process, because that in itself then makes it much, much more difficult for politicians 
to infuse the process with their own prejudices. 
He also raised the question of why investigations could not be triggered by organic growth: “I 
find it very odd that if a media group grows organically…., under the present rules of 
competition and plurality there’s nothing which triggers an ability for the competition 
authorities to have a look….”  
On the basis of his own somewhat painful experience of having his integrity impugned, 
Jeremy Hunt concluded in his oral evidence that perhaps the decision-making process could 
follow accepted competition practice:  
….if you’re giving so much weight to independent regulators at every stage and 
you’re removing your discretion to a very large degree, if not entirely, why not just 
give the whole decision to independent regulators? That’s what we do in competition 
law. It used to be in competition law that those decisions were made also by 
secretaries of state and we removed that and gave that to independent regulators. 
Hunt’s position was echoed by David Cameron who raised the question of “removing 
politicians from decision-making positions in respect of media takeovers” and by (Lord) 
Chris Smith, the Blair government’s first Culture Secretary from 1997 to 2001 who told 
Leveson in his oral evidence that “I believe very strongly, looking back on my time at 
Secretary of State [and] what’s happened subsequently, that those decisions should almost 
certainly not rest with a political figure, however honourable that person may be; that 
decisions about applying the public interest plurality tests to media ownership issues are 
matters that should be for either the Competition Commission or Ofcom or both, and should 
not rest in the hands of a Secretary of State.” 
Government inaction 
As an integral element of his inquiry’s terms of reference, Sir Brian Leveson was asked to 
make recommendations on plurality, regulation and cross-media ownership. Perhaps because 
he devoted so much time and thought to the perennially intractable problem of press 
regulation, just 15 of 1987 pages of the four volume report were allocated to 
 recommendations on plurality which were pitched, in his own words, at the level of 
“desirable outcomes and broad policy framework”. He invited the government to consider 
whether periodic plurality reviews or an extension of the public interest test might provide a 
“timely warning” of developing plurality concerns.29 
After much speculation that it was going to produce a full-blooded Communications Green 
Paper, covering all aspects of media policy, the government chose only to publish what it 
called a “Consultation Paper” on media ownership in July 2013.30 Rather than explore the 
major policy concerns raised during Leveson, this paper confined itself to “the scope of a 
measurement framework for media plurality”. It then proceeded to outline five measurement 
criteria, focussing purely on audience consumption of news and current affairs. This 
simplistic approach therefore excluded any notions of media influence on politicians, 
regulators or policy makers, or on the news and policy agenda. In short, it severely 
circumscribed the notion of media power. It also excluded any broader consideration of the 
efficacy of the public interest plurality test, the need for periodic reviews, the involvement of 
government ministers in the decision-making process, and the need for streamlining a 
complex regulatory process.31 
More progress was made by a House of Lords select committee inquiry, which made a 
number of imaginative recommendations around regular reviews, rationalising the regulatory 
investigation process, and giving more powers to Ofcom.32 Government reaction is unlikely 
to be much more than a non-specific “welcoming” of the report, particularly just a year 
before a general election on such a delicate issue. 
On media concentration, then, just as with data protection, progress appears to be grinding to 
a halt. The urgency and anger which defined debates in the summer of 2011, when senior 
politicians rushed to apologise for their proximity to media proprietors, have subsided. 
Meanwhile, News UK (originally News International) launched the Sun on Sunday in 
February 2012, thus restoring News Corp’s 36% of national newspaper circulation in the UK. 
And according to a Daily Telegraph report, Rupert Murdoch is contemplating a renewed bid 
for the whole of BSkyB which “makes more strategic sense now than it did in 2010”.33 Any 
bid would come from his newly created film and TV company, 21st Century Fox which he 
split from his publishing empire News Corp, but in ownership terms the end result would be 
no different: a highly profitable and enormously powerful media conglomerate ultimately 
controlled by one individual.  
Conclusion 
In his written evidence to Leveson, David Cameron conceded that neither the Labour 
government at the time nor his own opposition reacted with appropriate urgency to either the 
Information Commissioner’s reports in 2006, or to a critical Culture Select committee report 
in 2003: “It is not clear that Government Ministers at the time took these concerns seriously 
enough and they did not take action to change Government policy. Similarly, I regret that 
opposition front bench politicians failed to devote enough time to scrutinise the Government 
and hold them to account for their inaction.” He continued: “there are dangers to the public 
 interest if politicians fail to set their own agenda rather than merely respond to media 
campaigns.”  
In evidence to the House of Commons Liaison Committee Inquiry on 6 September 2011, 
Cameron conceded that “what is clear is that the relationship became too close in that the 
politicians were spending a lot of time trying to get their message across and win support, but 
the issues of regulation were being put on the back burner”, adding in his oral evidence that 
proper engagement with regulatory issues “wasn’t happening, and I think that’s been 
happening under governments of both parties for some time.”  
Returning to the theme at Prime Ministers Questions on 25 April 2012, Cameron appeared to 
make a commitment: “I think on all sides of the House there’s a bit of a need for a hand on 
heart. We all did too much cosying up to Rupert Murdoch.” In response to needling from Ed 
Miliband, Cameron responded: “The problem of closeness between politicians and media 
proprietors had been going on for years and it’s this government that’s going to sort it out.” 
Two years on, there is little indication of political will on either of these issues to “sort it 
out”. Nor, to be fair, does it appear that any great pressure is emerging from the Opposition. 
There is every likelihood that we are reverting to the kind of foot-dragging that has long 
characterised the post-Callaghan era of media-politician relationships: a fear of antagonising 
media proprietors, particularly in advance of what is likely to be an unpredictable and closely 
fought election campaign, and particularly when these issues are scarcely burning topics on 
the doorstep. It is far more likely that manifesto commitments on media reform, which are 
already being developed, will remain at the level of broad principles with a vague 
commitment to “sort it out” after the next election. 
Little, it seems, has changed. On 4 October 2010, with allegations of phone hacking still 
bubbling under and with the Milly Dowler revelations still 9 months away, the Telegraph’s 
Peter Oborne presented an outstandingly prescient Dispatches programme on Channel 4. He 
painted a profoundly disturbing picture of blatant intimidation by a burgeoning media empire 
which included overt threats of tabloid revelations to secure compliance. Oborne rehearsed 
the Information Commissioner’s findings in 2006 that newspapers were unlawfully mining a 
wealth of personal information, and reminded viewers that this criminal activity had resulted 
in just two convictions. On the programme, Guardian journalist Nick Davies quoted his own 
sources from within Scotland Yard: “they will tell you that there was a constant and 
articulated fear that if we pursue this investigation too hard…. we are going to alienate the 
most powerful newspaper group in this country and we don’t want to do that”.  
Oborne also asked why Parliament and government were so supine in tackling an issue of 
such fundamental public interest, and concluded that the answer lay in the unchecked power 
and influence of News Corporation. John Prescott admitted on the programme that Labour 
was scared of alienating News International in advance of the 2010 election. Plaid Cymru MP 
Adam Price – a member of the Culture Select Committee which investigated phone hacking 
allegations in 2009 – told Oborne that committee members did not compel News 
International Chief Executive Rebekah Brooks to give evidence because of fears that 
 journalists would delve into their personal lives. And MP Tom Watson told him that former 
ministers were not prepared to go public about having their phones hacked “because at the 
moment they feel frightened and intimidated by News International”. 
That particular ghost was laid by the Leveson Inquiry, and the scale of that criminal activity 
is now better known and being addressed through the courts. But neither the specific problem 
of widespread and unlawful data-mining nor the democratic problems implicit in media 
power being concentrated in too few hands show any sign of prompting serious political 
action. Four years on from Oborne’s programme, three years on from the Milly Dowler 
revelations and abandonment of News Corp’s BSkyB bid, and nearly two years on from 
publication of the Leveson Report, our politicians appear to be no nearer to correcting the 
serious imbalance of power relations. Just as it was in the days of Margach – though for 
precisely opposite reasons – the electorate and the public interest are being seriously 
compromised. 
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